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ABSTRACT
A brief resume of the role of linear utility functions in Game
Theory is given. The point is made that, in practical applications, a
knowledge of these functions is usually not available, and hence much
of the rationale of the game theoretic approach to competitive problems
is lost. The random character of the "real" payoff of a matrix game is
then discussed, and the probability distribution function of the payoff
is derived. The dependence of this distribution function upon the mixed
strategies of the players is shown. Criteria are developed to provide
definition of "optimal mixed strategy" in terms of the effect on the
distribution function. The mathematical formulation of the solution is
given for each criterion discussed.
The reader will require knowledge of the elements of Probability
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate a difficulty that inevit-
ably exists whenever an application of the mathematical Theory of Games
is made in a non-idealized situation. We shall restrict our attention to
the class of two-person matrix games, although the basic question arises
in connection with n-person and continuous games as well. Briefly stated,
the problem is as follows:
In the logic of the Theory of Games, a vital part is played by the
so-called "linear" utility function, a real-valued function defined over
the space of outcomes associated with a game. In actual practice, it is
very doubtful that this function will be available to, let us say, a mil-
itary operations analyst who wishes to formulate a practical problem as
a game. On the other hand, when the situation involves a conflict of in-
terest between intelligent antagonists, with an element of chance affect-
ing the outcome of any course of action, t is difficult to find a concept
of "rational procedure" or "optimal dec's on" which does not involve the
game theoretic approach. Therefore the question becomes: in the absence
of an important part of its machinery, what: adaptations of Game Theory
can provide us with reasonable solutions to problems of practical impor-
tance?
In standard texts on the Theory of Games, it is usual to present a
discussion of utility theory at an early stage. The axioms leading to
construction of the linear utility function (hereafter referred to as
the l.u.f.) are developed, and once this has been done, it is customary
to assume that the appropriate l.u.f. 's are known, and proceed with the
mathematical development of the theory.

We wish to change this procedure slightly, in order to do two things:
(1) Clarify the theoretical role of the l.u.f. in the logic of Game
Theory,
(2) Emphasize the vital importance to the military operations analyst
of a knowledge of appropriate l.u.f.'s, when formulating "real" problems
in game- theoretic terms.
2, Typical formulation of a competitive situation as a matrix game.
Distribution of the payoff.
Suppose that a situation involving conflict of interest between two
parties ("player I" and "player II") has been analysed so as to yield the
following quantities;
(1) The space of all pure strategies available to player I.
(2) The space of all pure strategies available to player II.
(3) A matrix, the elements of which describe what happens when play
er I follows his itn pure strategy, and player II follows his j tn pure
strategy (i= l,2,...m; j= l,2,...n).
We shall assume that the outcome, or payoff to player I, resulting
from the choice (i,j) of pure strategies, can be measured in terms of a
single "real commodity", e.g., money, or casualties, etc.
The first important point we make here is that nothing in Game
Theory requires that a fixed real-commodity payoff to player I be assoc-
iated with the pair (i,j). Rather, the requirement is this: the payoff
to player I resulting from the choice (i, j) is a random variable Xjj,
the distribution function of which is known to both players. Denote this
distribution function by Fjj(x) = P[Xj_j-x| . This leads us to the
1. This restriction simplifies the notation without affecting the logic
of the argument.

following Definition: P(x) =
[
fFij(x))| is a matrix of known distrib-
ution functions. This matrix describes in probabilistic terms the pay-
off to player 1 associated with each possible choice (i,J) of pure strat-
egies by the players
,
Now assume that the players wish to employ mixed strategies.
Q* * (qi*q2»« ai<W i8 a «ixed strategy of player I.
P' (Pi»P2»^«Pn^ is a mi3ce<* strategy of player II.
When the mixed strategies Q and P are used, we can determine the
probability distribution function of the payoff to player I as follows:
Define Y to denote the real commodity payoff to player I when the
mixed strategies Q and P are used in conjunction with the matrix F(x).
Then
G(y) E P[Y-y] » f-r P[Y = Xij] P^j^y] , i.e.,
G(y) - £j q^jFijCy) . (eq. 1)
This can be written in matrix notation as:
G(y) - Q'P(y)P . (eq. 2)
Looking at equations 1 and 2, we can see that the distribution of
the "real" payoff to player I involves two types of parameters: (1) those
associated with the distributions Fjj(x), which are assumed given and un-
changeable, and (2) the elements q^, p« of the matrices Q and P. These
are under the control of the players.
We can now formulate the objective of player I in choosing his mixed
strategy Q. Player I wishes to choose Q so as to optimize, in some sense,
the form of the distribution function G(y) c This interpretation of the
role of a mixed strategy is a central feature of this paper.

Ac this point, the theory of the l,u«f* enters tfo© picture. In the
next section we ase how the i,u,,f- provides a criterion whereby each player
may make a preferential ordering of his possible mixed strategies, and
select an optimal one,
3. The theoretical and practical roles of the l.u.f.,
Appendix A presents for quick reference the axiomatic development of
the l.u.f., largely following the excellent treatment in Luce and Raiffa
[2] . Appendix B gives a very slight extension of the idea, primarily so




In this section, we do no more than write down some conclusions and
interpretations concerning the l.u.f. Appendices A and B are, hopefully,
arranged so that the reader who wishes to check the reasoning behind the
statements made here may do so easily.
The pertinent conclusions concerning the l.u.f. are the following:
(1) The axiomatic design of a player's l.u.f. is such that it calls
on information not available in the matrices F(x), Q, and P, in order to
measure the true value that a real commodity ha® for the player, vis-a-vis
the gambles involved in a risky situation (i.e., the game).
(2) Suppose a player enters a gamble of the following form: he will
win (or lose) a random amount X of some commodity, where X has the known
distribution function H(x), This is called a "simple" gamble,. If the
player has a l.u.f. u(x) defined over the commodity, he can compute the
true value v which the simple gamble has for him by forming the




v « Eiu(X)] - iu(x)dH(x) .
(3) Suppose the player is involved in a "compound" gamble; that is,
with probability a^ he enters a simple gamble H^Cx), k = l,2,....n.
The true value v to the player of this compound gamble can be computed in
u<x)d[^ s kak \u(x)dHk(x)
terms of his l.u.f. as :
v = E[u(X)J - W(x t ^ Hk (x)
-co
(4) Even though the operation involved in (2) and (3) above is that
of taking an expected value of u(X), the interpretation of v as a "true
value" does not depend upon there being many repetitions of the gamble.
The l.u.f. is so designed that it measures the value of a one-time gamble.
(5) Once a player has determined what his l.u.f. u(x) is for a cer-
tain commodity x, he can use u(x) to compare any two gambles involving x.
If Hi(x) and H2 (x) are the distribution functions associated with any two





(x) and v^ - u(x)dH2<x)
'-<»
"-co
The gamble involving H.(x) is preferred to the gamble involving H2 (x) if
and only if V| > v2 . By using u(x) in this way, the player obtains a com-
plete and transitive ordering of his preference for all possible gambles
over the commodity x.
These are the five conclusions which are of most interest to us.
Next, we make some interpretations, based on these conclusions*
1. This property of u(x) contributes the unfortunate word "linear" to
the name of the l.u.f.

(1) When the players in a two-person matrix game make a choice of
pure strategies, a "simple" gamble results, From player I's point of view,
this gamble involves the random variable Xj. , with distribution function
Fij(x).
(2) When the players employ mixed strategies Q and P, player I faces
a "compound" gamble Involving the random variable Y with distribution
function G(y), as given by equation 1.
(3) Recall our earlier observation that by his choice of a mixed
strategy Q, player I exerts himself to determine a form of G(y) which is
in some sense optimal for him. We now interpret the theoretical role of the
l.u.f. in the logic of Game Theory to be: the l.u.f. is a criterion-
providing device that enables a player to compute which form of G(y), and
hence which mixed strategy, is best for him.
(4) Suppose that a matrix game Involves a real commodity x for which
the players know their l.u.f. 's to be u,(x) and U2<x) respectively. Suppose
further that u2 (x) = -u^(x). This is of course the so-called "zero-sum"
assumption. If the players use mixed strategies Q and P, we write the
distribution of the real payoff Y as G(y) = G(y;Q,P) to emphasize the depen-
dence of this function upon the players' choices. It now follows from the
discussion under conclusion (5) above, that for extreme conservatism the
optimal choices (^ « (<Ix » * * • • %) ***& p " (Pl»»»»»Pn) of mixed strategies
are defined by the equation
no
.CO
u(y)dG(y;(^,P ) « max min \ u(y)dG(y;Q,P)
OO Q P 4>
(eq.3)
» min max \ u(y)dG(y;Q,P) •
P Q ^00
Written in this form, the definition of optimal Q , P looks unfamiliar
o o

and rather formidable. However, referring to equation 1, we can re-write
equation 3 as:
frqM \u(y)dF..(y) = max min zZq,P 4 \u(y)dFl4 (y)1,J J ;
.«,
J Q P i,j J loo J
(eq. 4)
The "linear" property of u(x) discussed under conclusion (3) above makes





and to re-write equation 4 as
/ 9iP?*ii max nin /_ <liP,*n* <«q- 5)
i,J J J Q P i,J J J
By introducing the utility matrix A l|(ai«)J| > w® can reduce equation 5
to the familiar form:
Q'AP = max min Q'AP - min max Q'AP . (eq. 6)
^ ° Q P P Q
Thus we have seen, step by step, how knowledge of a player's l.u.f.
for a commodity x lies at the center of the famous minimax formulation of
the zero-sum game solution, as given in equation 6. The essential obser-
vation to make is: if the l.u.f. 's are not known, the rationale leading
to equation 6 as a definition of optimality breaks down, for there can be
no guarantee that the players are maximizing (minimizing) the "true value"
of the compound gamble represented by the game. In particular, it is not
in general correct to replace a. . by the quantity m. . = \ xdFj<(x), and
to maximize (minimize) the expected real value of the game. To do so
ignores the entire scheme for evaluating gambles that is provided by the

construction of the l,u.£.
This completes our review of the role of the l.u.f. and its practical
importance to the operations analyst who wishes to use the "customary"
approach to the solution of a matrix game, as represented in the zero-sum
case by equation 6.
In the next section, we discuss procedures for handling a competitive
situation when a knowledge of l.u.f«,'s is not available* It seems approp-
riate, however, to first answer the question, "Why not devote the effort
instead to the problem of determining the l.u.f. experimentally, rather than
adopting the pessimistic attitude that appropriate l.u.f.'s are not likely
to be known?"
The answer, of course, is that a great deal of work has been done in
an effort to measure representative UuJ.'s, and the results have been
largely discouraging, not to say unbelievable, See, for instance, [3]
and [4] . Since experiments performed under controlled and simplified
laboratory conditions have failed to yield satisfactory results, it does
not seem reasonable to assume that the military operations researcher,
working with far more complex problems of value, will be able to isolate
functions which truly describe how responsible military commanders evaluate
difficult situations in terms of "linear utilities". As a practical matter,
it seems much more sensible to look for procedures which make some sense
in the absence of knowledge about linear utilities.
One more point should be made before we go on. If we are going to
abandon all knowledge of utility functions and attempt to "solve" compet-
itive situations (games) using only the distribution function G(y) as a




Consider the situation in which a matrix game has been tonaulated, and
a knowledge of appropriate l.u.f.'s assumed, In this case, if the payoff
is zero-sun, the assertion of Game Theory is that there is a logical and
highly plausible definition of "optimum solution" available, and a scheme
for finding it • In other words, we are guaranteed the optimum result.
Contrast this with the situation that exists when no knowledge of
the l.u.f. is assumed. This lack of knowledge means that we do not know how
to value the commodity for which we are gambling, vis-a-vis the risks in-
volved. It is clearly unrealistic to hope that, in this condition of ignor-
ance, we shall be able to characterize any decision we make as the optimal
one. We can hope to formulate criteria which may be "plausible" and
"reasonable" when applied to specific situations, and we can hope that these
criteria, through their mathematical formulation, will lead to decisions
which are "approximately optimal". This is of course a very loose state-
ment, since we do not have, and will not formulate, a means of measuring
"distances" between a theoretical optimum and any other point in the space
of possible solutions. We are simply proceeding in accordance with the be-
lief that it is better to have some well-understood criterion for the good-
ness of a decision, and some systematic scheme for computing what that
decision should be, keeping in mind all the potential shortcomings, than
to have none at all and simply proceed hit-or-miss.
4. Criteria for the solution of matrix games in the absence of linear
utility functions .
Consider first the case of a game that is going to be played one time
only. Por this case, we shall formulate solutions that are approximately
1. We have not discussed such schemes so far, but the "simplex method"
may be regarded as a general algorithm for solving this class of games.

optimal under the following criteria:
Criterion A: That mixed strategy is best for player I which
maximizes the probability that the real-commodity payoff will
lie in any one of a finite number of given, disjoint inter-
vals, assuming that player II acts so as to minimize this
probability.
Criterion B: That mixed strategy is best for player I which
1) maximizes the probability that the real-commodity
payoff will exceed a given amount b, subject to the condition
that
ii) the probability that the payoff is less than a given
amount c, shall be less than a given figure a, no matter what
strategy player II uses. Assume that player II wishes to min-
imize the probability that player I receives more than b.
These are certainly not the only criteria one could consider. How-
ever, they have features which are of practical value. Three obvious
special cases of Criterion A call for
(1) maximizing the probability that the real payoff exceeds a given
value (perhaps some "critical" value),
(2) minimizing the same probability,
(3) maximizing the probability that the payoff lies in some specified
interval.
Certainly one can think of practical situations in which one of these
might be a very reasonable course of action to follow. What is more impor-
tant, it is not hard to imagine that a military commander might have just
enough information to decide on one or two "critical" values, when a utility
10

measure over all possible ©uteoaes would fee impossible to find^ As an ejiam-
ple, the commander who decides, "I mist at all costs destroy at least 80%
of the enemy fleet in this engagement", has adopted special case (1) above
as his criterion for an optimal course of action, A more homely example
would be an expert poker player who decides, "I want to win at least twenty
dollars in this game, but I'd better not win more than fifty, or these
people might not let me fleece them in the future. " The poker expert is
looking toward special case (3).
Obviously, Criterion A is worth considering. The general formulation
i
is no more difficult than the special cases, as will be seen .
It is a little harder to read sense into Criterion B at first glance,
but an example will make it clear that it too has a plausible, common-sense
basis, Suppose a businessman has the following thoughts: "I would like
very much to make a profit of $100,000 or more this year. ($100,000 -
given amount b). On the other hand, I'll have to take some risks to do that.
I have some debts outstanding, my son enters Harvard this September, and I
want to vacation in Hawaii this year. If I show a profit of less than
$10,000, things are going to be tough. ($10,000 - given amount c), Weil,
I'll try for the big profit, but only if I can work it so that my chances
of making less than $10,000 are small; say about 10% s " (10% - given figure
a).
One can easily construct examples with a military flavor, involving
the value of an objective, and the risks and costs associated with achieving
it. As with criterion A, the point is this: It is far more reasonable to
expect our businessman in the example to somehow get hold of the figures
$100,000, $10,000, and 10%, than it Is to expect him to construct his
1. It is also convenient to solve this problem for any finite number of




complete l.u.f. for money. As for asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff what
their combined l.u.f. for casualties in Southeast Asia might be —one
shudders at the thought.
In connection with both Criteria, we have made the assumption, essent-
ially, that player II 's aims will be directly opposed to those of player I.
>^ Obviously, in many real situations this will not be true. When we deal
with this difficulty, we get into the whole problem of non-zero-sum games,
definitions of stable solutions, etc.
Now, in the absence of l.u.f. 's, or any measure of "true value" assoc-
iated with real outcomes of a game, we lack the means for deciding whether
or not a game is zero-sum. Hence, we should really consider the difficult
non-zero-sum case. To get around this situation, we adopt the following
point of view, which should be regarded as part of Criteria A and B, and
therefore as an "input" to any solution stemming from them:
Tne Post conservative policy that player I can follow is to assume
that player II is an "implacable foe". In practical situations where this
is largely true, all will be well, and incorporation of this assumption
will be largely justified. When this assumption is not true, player I will
get at least slightly better results than if player II were "implacably
opposed", but will not be able to take maximum advantage of possible
"community of interest" arrangements, etc. In this latter case, the pro-
cedures which we develop here probably will not be very good, and player I
should exercise his ingenuity to analyze the special features of the part-
icular situation, in order to find a better solution. In other words, a
practical application of these ideas requires a realistic look at the con-
text in which they are to be applied, and no good solution can be expected
from their use in inappropriate circumstances.
12

Mathematical fenmslation of the solution under criterion A,
We are still dealing with the case where the real payoff is one*
dimensional, that is, expressible in terms of a single real commodity x.
Following the previous notation, let Q and P be mixed strategies of
players 1 and II respectively, F(x) the matrix defined on page 3, and Y
the real payoff to player I resulting from choices of Q and P. Denote




" Ea2» b2^ *"
I - [a ,b ] . Then
n n n
n /b^
p [y^Ii ©r Y6l« or... yei J - 21 \ dG <y>
* n k»l \
ks=1 L. Lf—,q4 p *¥.,(?) J byl
-i73 <*i j
FijO^-' y elation 1.
fci iTjVj \ dF<4 (y) - fci £j
iP
J Lii Vk' ii VJ
Using matrix notation (see equation 2), re-write this as
Q' 0(b) - F(a )] P + Q» j>(b ) - F(a )] P + .....+ Q» [p(b ) - F(a )] P11 c i. n M
- Q' [F(b,) + ... + F(b ) - F(a ) -,..-P(aB)]p .
In the last expression, denote the matrix [fOO +..- F(aR )] by H. This
is a matrix of real numbers, completely determined by F(x) and the intervals
I., which are given quantities. Therefore, Q'HP is an ordinary bilinear
form, and under our assumption about the behaviour of player II, conservative
optimal mixed strategies and P are defined by






The nice feature of this result is of course that all the machinery
for finding Q and P that one uses in connection with zero- sura games, is
appropriately used here. The difference lies in the interpretation of H
as a matrix whose elements come from probability calculations, rather than
a utility function.
In the special case of maximizing P [Y > c] where c is some "critical"




P[Y>c] = \ dG(y) = 2_ ) *Vu (y) = Jl ¥l L1 " *ii<c>] •
>c i,j Jc XJ i,J J 1J
To put this in the more convenient matrix notation, define 1 to
ran
be a m-by-n matrix each element of which is unity, and write
P [Y>c] = Q'lJL^ - P(c)]P .
Optimal strategies and P are defined by
Qoknn- F (c >] p = ^^^n Q* LW F <c >] p <•<!• 8 >
An interesting sub-special case develops when the probability dis-
tributions F..(x) of the matrix F(x) are degenerate, that is:
F..(x) for x * hjj
1 for x > h^ i
This corresponds to the case where the real-commodity payoff associated
with the choice (i,j) of pure strategies is a fixed amount h^., rather
than random. In this case the matrix [l - F(c)J of equation 8 is a
matrix in which each element is either zero or one. Choice of a simplified
criterion certainly leads in this case to a simplified problem to be solved.'
14

6. Mathematical formulation of the solution under Criterion B.
The procedure for finding an optimal strategy under Criterion B is
somewhat more complicated than it is under Criterion A, We use a linear
programming approach [5j , [6] . The problem turns out to be of the
"maximization" variety, which entails
(1) maximizing a linear form 4r w .« fc i in non-negative variables t .,
subject to
(2) a set of linear constraints (inequalities) on the variables t .
.
Once such a problem has been correctly formulated, the set of val-
ues of the variables t^ that maximizes the linear form may be found
(provided a set satisfying the constraints exists) by the "Simplex
Method" [s] , i_6j , which may be regarded as a general algorithm for solv-
ing linear programming problems. In any particular case, the amount of
computation involved may be enormous, so that a high-speed computer may
be needed to get actual numerical results. Conceptually however, the
solution is always computable when it exists.
In Appendix 5 of their book "Games and Decisions", Luce and Ralffa
give an excellent formulation of the ordinary two-person zero-sum game
solution as a linear programming problem. The problem here turns out to
be of a very similar form, so the reader might wish to refer to Luce and
Raiffa before going on.
Using the same notation as before, the solution is developed in
nine steps as follows:
(1) Let F(b) have dimensions m x n, and consider the matrix equation
F(b)' Q = B .
1. Not necessarily unique.
15

The n x 1 matrix B is defined by this equation, and consists of elements




" £ VijW •
It is easy to see that B is the probability that Y £ b, when player I
J
th
uses mixed strategy Q and player II uses his j pure strategy. Note that
B ^0 for all j.
(2) Define B. = max B*jo j J
Player I wishes to maximize P Ly > b] , and therefore to minimize P [Y ^ b] .
Hence, under our assumption about the behavior of player II which was pre-
viously stated, the objective of player I becomes: choose Q so as to min-
imize B. .
(3) Define the m x 1 matrix U - (1/B. )Q , and define 1 to be anJO "
n x 1 matrix, each element of which is unity. Then we have
and consequently,
F(b)'U ^ 1 .
n




^/ Bjo* ' * " 1 > 2 » e °'»m *




(5) Mext, note that
ra m
i-l i=l l Jo J<
This can also be written as
ru = i/B ,m Jo
where 1' is an m x 1 matrix of one's. Since player I wishes to minimize
m
B. , he therefore will maximize 1/B. , which is equivalent to maximizing
Jo Jo
the linear form l'U .
m
(6) Thus, l'U is the linear form in non-negative variables to be max-
imized, and from step (3) above, the matrix equation F(b)'U^l represents
a set of linear constraints,
(7) There is, however, another set of linear constraints to be con-
sidered. Recall that under Criterion B, we demand P [y=cJ £ a , against
each pure strategy of player II. The matrix equation which expresses this
requirement is
F(c)'Q^a ln .
We need to include this equation among the constraints. To do this, re-
call that
Therefore,
1/B, ° V U ,jo m
F(c)'Q(l/B
4
) ^ a 1 (l'U) ,
Jo n m
or
F(c)» U ^ a 1 ' U
,
ran
where 1 is an m x n matrix, each element of which is unity. Now define
tan
n to be an n x 1 raatrlx of zeros, and rewrite the last equation as
17









F(b)'U£l and [f(c)' -«r'|u4 .
n mn n
The two equations expressing the constraints can be combined into one
matrix equation. Define two partitioned matrices A and C as follows:
A' =
F(b)'






(9) The linear programming problem may now be written in final form
as
maximize 1" U , subject to A' UtC .m "
Of course, once U has been determined, player I's optimal strategy
is found by computing 1/B. = Z_ u^
,
so that ^optimal » Bj U
In conclusion, note that under Criterion B all the information neces-
sary to construct the matrix A is assumed given, so that only the comput-
ational problem remains. Furthermore, one can determine whether or not
a solution exists by computing min max Q* F(c) P. If this quantity is
Q P
greater than a, it is obvious that there can be no solution; conversely,
if it is smaller than a, there must be a solution.
7. Extension to the case of a real payoff which is not one-dimensional .
In the previous sections we considered games whose outcomes were measur*
able in terms of a single real commodity, e.g., money. Let us now consider
a case which, if not completely general, surely possesses enough general-
ity to be of practical use.
18

Suppose that a game can result in any one of r different outcomes, or
"atates" as we shall call them. Denote these states by Sj. , j = l,2,,««,r*
S, must be distinguishable from S. , for ©11 i^ j
Next, suppose that player I can make a complete and transitive order-
ing of the states S in terms of preference, where the word is used in its
everyday sense. By this we mean
(1) For any two states S„ and S. , i j* j , player 1 either prefers
S to S, , or vice versa,
i j
(2) If player I prefers S to S , and S to S^ , then he prefers S,
to ^ .
When player I is indifferent between S. and S*, i e , has equal pre-
ference for them, we interpret this to mean that the relations 9fSj pre-
ferred to Sj H and "S, preferred to Sj" hold simultaneously However, in
order to simplify notation, we shall assume a strict ordering exists, with
no cases of indifference, This assumption does not affect the validity of
what follows; the case of indifference can be included at the expense of
some extra symbols.
Now, let the states be re-numbered in ascending order of prefer* ace,
that is, S^ is the least preferred state, S^ the next-to-least preferred,
and so on until S is the mast preferred. During this process, we retain
the identity of each state, that is, we still know what real outcome each
of the symbols S. represents.
Next we define S to be the ordered set S - \ S. , $2 » * , S j of
the re-numbered states. It is important to note that the elements of S
are disjoint.
The purpose of all this is to lead to the following function. We
define X as a function with domains and range the set of integers
19

{l,2,...,rj , such that
X
Sj * j for all SjCSo
The function X is of course a random variable defined on the "sample
space" S. Inasmuch as the probability distribution over S is known for
each choice (i,j) of pure strategies, the distribution of X is also known.
Let us illustrate this fact. Suppose that corresponding to the choice
(1, j) of pure strategies, the distribution of the outcome was
P
£ [_
outcome is S.] p^ for all S^S
elsewhere.
The corresponding distribution of X is given by
P
t
. [x = k] = pk for k - 1,2, ...,r
• elsewhere.
Hence, given the matrix F(S ), k » l,2,...,r, of distribution functions
(which corresponds to the matrix F(x) of previous sections), we can immed-
*
lately construct the matrix F (k), k » l,2,...,r, the elements of which
are the distribution functions of X, corresponding to the pairs (i,j) of
pure strategies.
Since we are dealing with a discrete random variable, we can also con-
struct the matrix of probability mass functions which corresponds to F (k).
Denote this matrix of mass functions by J(k).
Now we can repeat essentially all the computations of previous sections.
For instance, if Q and P are the mixed strategies of the players, then (in
terms of player I's preferences)
1. By hypothesis; see p. 2.
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P _outcoiae is preferred to sJ » P [outcome is &4+\ or
sj+2 or"- or sr J = P [x - J+l] + P[x « J+2J + ... + P[x - rj
= Q' J(j+i) P + Q' J(j+2) P+ ..,+ Q' J(r) P
- Q' [J(J+D + J(j+2) + ... + J(r)] P .
Another example:
P outcome is either S. or S or. ,«„or S ] =
1 J K
P[X - ij + P[X - j] +....+ P[X - k] =
Q' [j(i) + J(j) + ....+ J(k)J P .
We shall not pursue the details, but it should he clear, and the reader
can easily verify, that everything goes through as before, including the
solutions under Criteria A and B,
Note that we have said nothing about the nature of the states S .
They may be defined in any way at all, quantitatively or qualitatively.
We have required only that they be distinguishable, and that player I must
have a transitive preference ordering over them,
8. Some comments concerning the distribution function C(y) .
In section 2 we derived the distribution function
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It seems worthwhile to point out that G(y) represents a special case
of an interesting class of distribution functions called "mixture distrib-
utions". For an excellent discussion of this type of function, and some
of its history, see 1_7_! . Generally speaking, a distribution of this type
arises when a sample is to be drawn from one of several populations, but
only a probability statement can be made as to exactly which one.
To illustrate one of the interesting properties of mixture distributions,
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let us find the mean of G(y) .
oo oo
E(Y) - ^ydC(y) «= )_ qiPj ( yd?i (y) = YL Vjmij'
where m^. E(X
i «) 9 If M = ||("i«)|| » tnen
E(Y) « Q'MP,
It Is easy to show that, if M° = (e(X° ))
E(Yn) = Q'M ? .
, then
>
Consequently, the variance of G(y) is given by
Var(Y) = E(Y2 ) - E2 (Y) = Q'M2? - m .
One may wish to ask, "If the distribution of Y can be written in terms
of the distributions F. . as shown, what is the functional relationship be-
tween Y and the Xj»?"„ This can lead to some confusion unless it is real-
ized that Y is defined by the equation G(y) - P [y £ yj = Q'F(y)P , No
other relation between Y and the X, . is needed.
9. Conclusion .
There are two major conclusions which, it is hoped, the reader will
have drawn from this paper. They are
(1) A major practical stumbling block in the application of Game
Theory to real problems is the unavailability of linear utility functions.
We have seen how necessary a knowledge of these functions is, when it comes
to making actual computations in order to solve a matrix game in the "usual"
sense.
(2) Despite this difficulty, there are reasonable procedures which can
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be adopted, provided circumstances vorrant, la order to define and compute
"optimal" solutions.
This paper Is Intended only to illustrate sonse idsas, and not Co make
a complete analysis of any particular class of solutions* life hope the
reader will agree that the general scheme discussed here has possibilities
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AXIOMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINEAR UTILITY FUNCTION
Chapter 2 of "Games and Decisions" by Luce and Raiffa gives an ex-
cellent presentation of this subject, and the reader is referred to
their book for a detailed discussion of the axioms which follow,
Definitions and notation. Assume all gambles or "lotteries" under
discussion involve a finite set of prizes or alternatives,
A » ' A|, A
2 ,
. ..., A . A simple lottery is defined to be a chance
mechanism which associates with each alternative A a known probability
p. P-CAj), i 1,2, . „.,r , V Pi = 1« A simple lottery L is thus a
probability distribution over A, and may also be regarded as an r»tuple,
L {PiAp Pa^* c *°» PrAr! *
A compound lottery is a two- stage chance mechanism, which, with
probability qA , yields a simple lottery L* ' as the result of its first
V (i)
stage, (i - l,2,..,s; vq^ = 1), The simple lottery L then con-
stitutes the second stage. We symbolize a compound lottery by
X s8 {^i^ » •••» *lsL 1 » an 8" tuPle '» Note that X, is again no more
s <j)than a probability distribution over A, where P^ (A^) jr~ q*p^ .
The purpose is to derive the utility function of an individual .
When we speak of preferences, they are the preferences of that individual ,
The symbol >, expresses a preference ordering. That is, A^ £ A.
means that the individual prefers A. to A. or is Indifferent between
them, and L i, L' or X.i £. expresses the same relationship between two
lotteries. If A^l A. and A.~ A^ hold simultaneously, we write A^-A,.
The symbol ~ denotes indifference between the two alternatives.
Throughout what follows, it is assumed that the set A has been
ordered so that A, is the most preferred alternative, and so on down,
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until Aj. is the least preferred. This can he done with no loss of gener-
ality.
Axiom 1 , The preference ordering !t , a binary relation, yields a complete
and transitive ordering of A.
"Complete" means, for any A
A
and A. in A, either aIa, or A £a^.
Axiom 2 . Let X be a compound lottery and L a simple lottery. If
PL(A1 ) - P^ (A ) for all Aj in A, then £~ Lc
This says that it is only the character of a lottery as a probability
distribution which interests the individual.
Axiom 3 . Each alternative A. is indifferent to some simple lottery
which mixes only A , the best alternative, and A , the worst alternative.
That is, for every A^ in A, there exists some probability u^, such that
Ai~luiAl» < l " "i^l •
Axiom 4 . If Aj^ [ujA^, (1 - u^Ay] , then in any simple lottery
L (PiAx, ..., P^, ...» PjAj,), pjAj may be replaced by PiCuiA^, (1 - ui)Ar]
Axiom 5 . The relations £ and ~» are transitive among lotteries, just as
they are among the elements of A.
This is obviously desirable, but it cannot be deduced from the pre-
ceding axioms, and so must be included separately.
Axiom 6 . The relation [pA
,
(1 - p)Aj £ [p'Aj, (1 - p')aJ holds if
and only if p^p'.
These six axioms give us the following theorem, which is the point
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of the entire development:
Theorem , If the relation Z satisfies axioms 1 through 6, then there
exist numbers u. associated with the elements A, of A, such that for
any two lotteries L and V , the relation L £ L' holds if and only if
i=l i=l
u x
The proof is obvious from the axioms. Any compound lottery can be
reduced to a simple lottery involving A.,..,, A^,, which can in turn be
converted to another compound lottery involving just A, and A
r
, which can
be reduced to a simple lottery involving A^ and A,., which can by axiom 6
be compared with any lottery so treated. The "experimental" part of the
program lies in finding the numbers u. of Axiom 3. These first appear
in the guise of probabilities, and later turn out to be the utilities
which we sought. It is easy to show that any positive linear transfor-
mation of these numbers again yields a utility function which reflects
the individual' 8 preferences.
The reader who has followed through this derivation should easily




A NON-RIGOROUS EXTENSION OF THE LINEAR UTILITY CONCEPT.
In Appendix A, the assumption was made that the set A of alternatives
associated with any lottery L was finite, and that the lottery comprised
a probability mass function P. (A, ) defined on A, Suppose now we wish to
** i
enter a gamble G involving some numerically measurable and infinitely
divisible commodity x< Associated with G there is a probability density
function fG (x), defined over x?
We want to make all the logic and conclusions of Appendix A valid
for this case also, so we take the following position. All "continuous"
gambles discussed in this paper are such that
(1) If I is the interval over which x is defined, I may be parti-
tioned into a finite number of disjoint subintervals dx^, whose union
is I. If X is the random variable of the gamble, P [X € dxj] ~ fG (xi )dx, ,
where xjCdx^,
(2) By proper choice of dx. and x,, we can approximate £G (x) as
closely as we like by a probability mass function fG (:<i )dxi>
Once this has been done, all the logic of Appendix A will go through,
and the numbers u. can be found. We now assume that the set of numbers
U£ thus produced can be represented, as dx^-»0 and the number of subinter-
vals increases without limit, by a continuous curve u(x). When this is
the case, it is intuitively clear that the continuous expected value
calculation will have the same characteristics as the discrete calculation
in Appendix A.
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